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ABSTRACT
The proposed paper examines the role of pain in the creation of foundational 
political narratives by focusing on Boris Polevoi's 1946  Story of a Real Man (Povest' o 
nastoiashchem cheloveke).  Polevoi's Story, typical of wartime works of national 
cohesion,  operates by means of what I call prosthetic narrative:  the transformation of 
pain and suffering into an instrument of national victory.  In medicine and in common 
usage, a prosthesis is an artificial limb; in rhetoric, it is an addition or supplement (in 
both English and Russian). Polevoi's novella is prosthetic because it is a supplement to 
his journalistic account of the Nuremburg trials; it both excises and reattaches accounts 
of Nazi atrocities to the heroic Russian tale it tells, and it is a hybrid genre that combines 
biography, journalism, and fiction.  The work is prosthetic in another sense: its hero is a 
double amputee who resumes his mission as a cyborg bomber pilot. In Civilization and 
Its Discontents Freud noted technology's prosthetic function of extending human 
capacities beyond their limits. The use of technology to enhance human capacity is, 
however, double-edged. Central to the prosthetic device is the interrelation of loss and 
(improved) restoration: the artificial limb indicates the missing amputated limb. The 
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production of the national body depends on the excision of the injured limb that 
nonetheless persists in phantom form as an always available source for the continuous 
production of prosthetic national narrative.
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Real Men and Phantom Stories: Pain and Prosthesis in Soviet War 
Literature
In medical science, and in common usage in both English and Russian a 
prosthesis (protez) is an artificial limb; in rhetoric, it is an addition or supplement to a 
word. In his book Prosthesis David Wills  lists a string of activities that suggestively 
unite the philological and the orthopedic usage of the term: "placement, displacement, 
replacement, standing, dislodging, substituting, setting, amputating"(Wills 9). My 
discussion of  Soviet Socialist Realist war literature relies on this double meaning of the 
prosthetic, having to do both with bodies and pain and literary devices and strategies of 
representation.  I focus in particular on Boris Polevoi's 1946  Story of a Real Man 
(Povest' o nastoiashchem cheloveke). Well known in its time, the novel had over 2.34 
million copies in print within ten years of its initial publication in 1946(Kasack). 
Polevoi's Story is prosthetic because its hero is a double amputee who resumes his 
mission as a cyborg bomber pilot. The importance of the prosthesis in this text and others 
like it, however,  goes beyond orthopedically enabled heroism. The Story of a Real Man 
is a supplement to Polevoi's journalistic account of the Nuremburg trials; the testimony of 
Murav Page 4 12/6/2009
what was not called the Holocaust reattaches itself to the story of the amputee-pilot. More 
generally, as I will show, the literary prosthetic serves as a technology of reshaping the 
human being during the war years. The prosthetic transformation of injury and pain into 
an instrument of national victory is a highly productive trope in Soviet war literature.
Freud serves as a useful point of departure for the link between technology and 
prosthesis, although he was not the first to note the significance of this interaction. i In 
Civilization and Its Discontents Freud describes the numerous technical and mechanical 
means by which the defects and limits of human capacities, for example, of sight, 
hearing, movement, and memory—can be overcome:
 With every tool man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, 
or is removing the limits to their functioning. Motor power places gigantic 
forces at his disposal, which like his muscles, he can employ in any direction; 
thanks to ships and aircraft neither water nor air can hinder his movements; 
by means of spectacles he corrects defects in the lens of his own eye; by 
means of the telescope he sees into the far distance; by means of the 
microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the structure of his 
retina.  In the photographic camera he has created an instrument, which 
retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as a gramophone disc retains the 
equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materializations of the 
power he possesses of recollection, his memory.(Freud 37-38).ii 
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The use of artificial instruments and technical devices transforms humanity into a higher 
form of life.  Freud concluded, but not without irony: "Man has, as it were, become a 
kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent: 
(Freud 39).  Written in 1930, Freud's essay critically reflects on the love affair with 
technology  that was central to his time. 
Viktor Shklovsky is another important 20th century thinker who even earlier than 
Freud registered the impact of technology as prosthesis. In Zoo, Or, Letters Not about 
Love (ZOO, ili pis'ma ne o liubvi), first published in 1923, Shklovsky describes the 
impact of the instrument (in the sense of "tool") on the human being:
The instrument not only extends the human arm; but also extends into the 
human.  I do not experience any particular attachment to my footwear, but it 
is nonetheless an extension of me; it is a part of me. Most of all, it is the 
machine that changes the human being. 
To make his point, Shklovsky cites the scene from Tolstoy's War and Peace in which the 
gunner Tushin enters "a new world created by his artillery" (Shklovsky's language). 
Tolstoy writes that Tushin "imagined himself as a powerful man of enormous height, 
who hurled canon at the French with both hands." Instruments, and in particular, the 
instruments of war-- transform ordinary human beings into Freud's prosthetic gods. Even 
more than Freud, however, Shklovsky sees human beings as constructed by technology: 
"the machine gunner and the double bass player are extensions of their instruments." He 
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concludes: "Underground trains, construction cranes, and automobiles are humanity's 
prostheses" (protezy chelovechestva). 
There is a connection between  Shklovsky’s notion of art as device and his model 
of the human being as prosthetic extension. In his Theory of Prose, the device is the 
supplement that replaces character, emotion, biography, history, psychology, and 
everything else that up until the Formalists was taken as the central core of the artistic 
work. When Shklovsky says “skorost’ trebuet tsel’” velocity demands a purpose—the 
attribution of agency to “velocity” decenters the human subject. Shklovsky writes in a 
similar way about the artistic device that "creates content." In both cases the mechanism, 
whether linguistic or physical, takes over and extends the function previously attributed 
to the human author. 
The use of prosthetic or technological devices to enhance human capacity, 
whether for creativity or destruction, is, however, double-edged. What is added on 
always implies a capacity that is limited or has been destroyed. Central to the idea of the 
prosthetic is the interrelation of loss and (improved) restoration: the artificial limb 
indicates the loss of the amputated limb (Wills).iii The connection between enhancemen t 
and loss is central to the prosthesis of writing, which, according to Freud, and later, 
Derrida, is a device that replaces a missing voice ; for Derrida, however, voice is always 
already absent and not merely missing. Speech, writing, and narrative, the entire 
symbolic order function in absence and differentiation, and not presence and identity. 
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Soviet war literature, however, disavows  both foundational absence and contingent loss. 
In his important article "Trauma, Absence, Loss" Dominick LaCapra 
distinguishes between absence and loss and shows the pitfalls of conflating the two. He 
defines absence as constitutive of the human condition, as in the absence of metaphysical 
foundations, the absence of a unitary community and an integral self. Loss, in contrast, 
whether of an individual, a group, or a culture, is historically contingent. Mistaking loss 
for absence can lead to endless, paralyzing melancholy. Confusing absence (of 
foundations, for example, or of the unitary community) with loss may lead to "utopian 
politics in quest of a new totality or fully unified community." Conventional narrative, 
according to LaCapra, may also be guilty of confusing absence with loss, because the 
beginning of a conventional narrative, "construed as a variant of full presence, innocence, 
or intactness –is lost <…> only to be recovered at the end" (LaCapra). The happy 
endings of conventional literature and popular culture turn tragedy into triumph.  Eric 
Santer's analysis of German war stories of the 1980s identifies what he calls "narrative 
fetishism ... the construction and deployment of a narrative consciously or unconsiously 
designed to expunge the traces of the trauma or loss that called the narrative into being in 
the first place" (Santner).  Prosthetic narratives such as Polevoi's, however, not only deny 
foundational absence; they refuse to recognize even contingent loss. The prosthetic 
operation—hyperfetishism, if you will-- reattaches the missing limb to the injured hero, 
whose new body is not only intact, but even better than it was before. 
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Polevoi's  Prosthetic Hero
Polevoi's prosthetic hero was not new in 1946. The transformation of the human 
being into a super being made of metal was a central trope of Soviet proletarian poetry of 
the twenties (Hellebust). The proletarian poets' glorification of the new artificial man of 
metal and construction novels of the thirties celebrating the transformation of landscape 
and the human being under industrialization also relied on notions of technology that 
prosthetically extend human agency.
In the Soviet context of the 30s and 40s, the cult of Stalin is a crucial factor in the 
prosthetic transformation of the individual. It is not just technology that empties out 
individual human agency, but the power of the masses, embodied in the leader, to which 
individuals must subordinate themselves.iv In Itsik Fefer's poem "Stalin," for example, 
Stalin is the one name that replaces all personal pronouns: "I say Stalin—I mean us <…> 
I say Stalin—I mean you/ I say Stalin—I mean myself" (Zog ikh Stalin—meyn ikh mir 
<…> Zog ikh Stalin—meyn ikh dikh, / Zog ikh Stalin—meyn ikh zikh) (Fefer 
Roytarmeyish 4)  In Fefer's poem, there is no "I" or "you;" there is only Stalin, the 
universal prosthetic pronoun. To use the language of Polevoi's story, there is only one 
"real man" (nastoiashchii chelovek).v  This one real man, Stalin, fills in all the gaps. 
A Story of a Real Man does not refer to Stalin directly, but stages his presence 
through the undead figure of  the "commissar." In his moribund condition, (his face 
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"looked as if wax had been poured into it") the commissar brings a breath of "Moscow 
spring" to the hospital ward where the injured pilot Meres'ev receives treatment , 
inspiring him to try to fly again after his double amputation. The commissar reads the 
wounded pilot  Ostrovskii's How the Steel Was Tempered, the story of a civil war 
prosthetic hero who loses his vision, the use of legs, and the use of one arm, but 
continues to serve by writing novels. 
The moment that the amputee pilot sees the commissar die is the moment that he realizes 
that he "very much wanted to become a real man, just like the man who just now was 
being taken on his last journey" (I ochen' zakhotelos' Alekseiu stat' nastoiashchim 
chelovekom, takim zhe, kak tot, kogo seichas uvezli v poslednii put' ) (Polevoi Povest' O 
Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 147).
Meres'ev gets his wish when he flies his plane again. Polevoi writes, "He was 
fused with his machine, he sensed it as a continuation of his own body" (On slilsia so 
svoei mashinoi, oshchutil ee kak prodolzhenie sobstvennogo tela) (Polevoi Povest' O 
Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 249). He names himself a "real man" precisely in the last 
moment of a desperate battle with a German plane, when he is very nearly out of fuel 
("he became a real, yes, a real man," stal nastoiashchim . . . nu da, nastoiashchim 
chelovekom") (Polevoi Povest' O Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 287). Meres'ev feels the 
motor change as the fuel drops: "the pilot felt this in his whole body, as if it were not the 
motor, but he himself who was choking" (Polevoi Povest' O Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 
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296). Polevoi's hero loses all sense of the distinction between himself and his plane. He 
becomes a cyborg, in the sense that the originators of the term defined it, that is, a  "self-
regulating man-machine system."vi Just as the commissar is a "real man" as a waxen, 
reanimated corpse, Meres'ev becomes a real man only when his humanity is replaced and 
supplemented by the power of a machine. By the end of the story, the terrible pain, 
exhaustion, isolation, and despair that Meres'ev suffered no longer have any weight or 
meaning for the narrative.  The ordeals of surviving the plane crash, crawling for help, 
and undergoing the double amputation—are not even bad memories any more. They are 
simply erased.  
From atrocity to triumph
Polevoi's "real man" depends, as I have shown, on earlier Soviet literature, and on 
the ideology of the leader, Stalin. His "real man" most crucially depends on the war itself 
and the campaign of hatred of the enemy, a theme that Evgenii Dobrenko emphasizes in 
his work. Il'ia  Erenburg was the chief architect of this campaign. His numerous 
propaganda articles that appeared (in Russian) in Pravda in the spring and summer of 
1942, among which were included, "The Justification of Hatred, " "They Must Not Live," 
and "Kill!"—rely on a prosthetic series of substitutions while at the same time 
demonizing technology as particular to Nazi atrocity. In "The Justification of Hatred," for 
example, Ehrenburg describes German soldiers as "monsters" and "savages armed with 
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the latest technology." He provides both a geneology of and an incitement to hatred of the 
German enemy, affirming "hatred did not come to us easily,  We paid for it with whole 
cities and provinces, with hundreds of thousands of human lives" (Erenburg Voina 7).  In 
Ehrenburg's article, hatred supplants every other emotion: "Death to the German 
occupiers—these words sound like an oath of love <…> The death of every German—
this is a pledge that children will no longer know grief (Erenburg Voina 8).  As in Fefer's 
poem, the "oath" is also important in this work, where it is offered as a security against 
all future evil. The prosthetic structure of the narrative works in a series of steps, each 
replacing what came before: (1) hatred for the enemy replaces the awareness of loss; (2) 
hatred becomes attached to love; and (3) hatred is a guarantee of future happiness. 
Polevoi wrote Povest' o nastoiashchem cheloveke in the nineteen days that he was 
covering the Nuremberg trial. The connection between the novel and the trial, while 
noted in the critical literature, has not been analyzed. Polevoi's novel is prosthetic 
because it is a supplement to his journalistic account of the Nuremburg trials; it both 
excises and reattaches accounts of Nazi atrocities to the heroic Soviet tale it tells. Polevoi 
is not sure of his hero's true name (Meres'ev or Mares'ev); he cannot say where his hero 
is now, or what became of him, but there is no need of notes, or an additional meeting 
with him, because: 
he is always with me <…> In the courtroom, at evening parties in the press 
camp, at some gangster film that the press watches on occasion, I never part 
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with him. I hear and note down some piece of monstrous testimony, and I 
think of him, about this Russian man from the lower Volga, and when during 
the trial there is a discussion of the great feat of the Soviet people, about the 
valor of the Red Army, I see him before me—simple, guileless, frank, so 
Russian (i kogda na sude zakhodit rech' o velikom podvige sovetskogo 
naroda, o doblesti Krasnoi Armii, ia vizhu pered soboi ego—prostogo, 
beskhitrostnogo, iskrennego, takogo russkogo (Polevoi V Kontse Kontsov: 
Niuremburgskie Dnevniki 229).
The legless pilot is "always with" Polevoi—just as Stalin is "always with us"—both in 
the courtroom during the day and in the evenings, when Polevoi relaxed with other 
reporters,  including reporters from the US, smoking, drinking, and watching American 
gangster movies. The phantom "real man" is both an analgesic and a prophylaxis: 
analgesic against the pain of the "monstrous testimony" of Nazi atrocities and a 
prophylaxis against the temptations of the capitalist West.
The problem is that the analgesic and the prophylaxis prosthetically replace the 
very thing that they are supposed to guard against.  The "real Soviet man" is supposed to 
stand for everything the Nazis were not, but the story of how the real man came to be the 
real man reads very much like the testimony of how the Nazis produced what Vasilii 
Grossman and Hannah Arendt called "living corpses." Polevoi's account of the 
Nuremberg trials includes testimony of the medical experiments conducted at Dachau. 
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The first part of his story of the legless pilot's eighteen day journey on broken feet in 
German occupied territory reads like the account of the Dachau experiments to test the 
limits of pain, hunger, cold, and exhaustion.  When he catches sight of his reflection in a 
frozen pond, Meres'ev is startled at what he sees, "It looked like a skull over which dark 
skin had been stretched.  From dark hollows huge, round, wildly bright eyes looked out. " 
(Ono napominalo ob'iatnutyi temnoi kozhei cherep. Iz temnykh vpadim smotreli bol'shie, 
kruglye, diko blestevshie glaza) (Polevoi Povest' O Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 41).vii 
Later descriptions emphasize his moribund state: the pilot is "a human skeleton covered 
in dark skin, with sharply protruding kneecaps, with a round and sharp pelvis, with a 
completely sunken belly" (Polevoi Povest' O Nastoiashchem Cheloveke 57). Meres'ev 
resembles the emaciated Nazi concentration camp inmates that Polevoi heard testimony 
about in Nuremberg and about which he himself reported on in his articles for Pravda in 
1945. Remember that Polevoi says he writes The Story of a Real Man without reference 
to his notes about the pilot's ordeal and without recourse to interviews with him. Polevoi 
transforms the Nuremberg trials, the scene of testimony into the stuff of prosthetic 
narrative. The story of the cyborg-superhero completely absorbs the testimony of crimes 
against humanity into a narrative of Soviet triumph.  Reading the buried layers of 
testimony in the fiction requires an act of reading that is tantamount to an archeological 
dig.
The transformation of testimony into national prosthetic is remarkable for the 
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substitutions and slippages it entails, especially the operation that makes the body in pain 
into the national Soviet superbody, the "great feat of the Soviet people." This prosthetic 
operation can be found all over Soviet war literature, including not only Erenburg's 
propaganda articles, which I discussed earlier, but also example, Kazakevich's  Zvezda, 
Grossman's Za pravoe delo. Itsik Fefer's poem "Di shvue"(The Oath) is a particularly 
important example. Published in 1942 in the first issue of the Soviet Yiddish newspaper 
Eynikayt, the organ of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, it was translated into Russian 
as "Kliatva" and published in the journal Znamia in the same year (Fefer "Di Shvue"). 
The poem, which ultimately derives from Psalm 137, simultaneously produces the 
horribly mutilated body of the soldier and traces his transformation into a cyborg warrior. 
The poet swears that his hatred and wrath will not be spent until he feels his enemy's 
blood on his own flesh, and vows to fight on even if he loses both arms: 
And if the dark whirlwind tears off my arm
I will choke off the enemy's hateful breath with my other arm
And if a shell destroys my other arm, 
My sacred hatred will dull the pain <…>
If the night darkens my eyes with blindness 
My hatred –my sister in battle will not let me 
Bow my head. The eye of my heart will discover the enemy
The flame of my hatred will obliterate his memory forever (Un oyv s'vet der 
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fintsterer vikher a hant mir tseflikn,/ Vel ikh mit der tsveyter dem fayntlekhn 
otem dershtikn; / Un oyb s'vet a koyl mir di hant oykh d tsveyte tsedroybn, 
Vel ikh mit mayn heyliker sine dem veytik fartoybn <…> Un oyb s'vet di 
nakht mir mit blindkayt farleshn di oygn,/ Mayn sine—mayn shvester in 
shlakht vet nit lozn farnoygn / Mayn kop. Der flam fun mayn hos vet af eybik 
zayn zeykher farmekn) (Fefer Roytarmeyish 3).
The Russian translation, appearing in Znamia in 1942, reads: 
Klianus' ia pri solnechnom svete, pri svete mertsaiushchikh zvezd,
<...>
Moia nenavist' ne istechet, moi gnev do tekh por ne ostynet,
Poka na rukakh ne pochuvstvuiu krovi vraga svoego.
I esli vo mrake mne ruku odnu otorvet,
Ia drugoiu rukoiu dykhan'e vraga zadushu;
I esli kovarnyi snariad vtoruiu ruku otorvet,
Ia v gneve sviashchennom svoiu bol' zaglushu!
<...>
I esli mne noch' slepotoiu potushit glaza,
Sestra moia –nenavist'- ne dopustit, v boiu chtob sognulas'
Moia golova. Glazom sertsa povsiudu naidu ia vraga,
Ogon' moei nenavisti navsegda ego pamiat' sotret.
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The list of injuries could be extended; each successive injury transforms the body into an 
ever more powerful fighting machine. The prosthetic production of the national 
superbody depends on continuous injury. 
Shklovky and Freud's reflections on the relation between  humans and their 
instruments and indeed both earlier and later critical elaborations of the model of the 
human as already constructed, not natural, but worked on, or made by technology, 
including technologies of gender or of power--reveal  broad sweep of the human as 
prosthetic extension. The romance of the artificial man goes at least as far back as the 
legend of the Golem, and continues in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and Olesha's Ophelia. 
The Golem was reanimated in American comic books of the 1940s in the guise of various 
superheroes. The utopian projections of the human-machine of the 1920s and the 
deconstructive models of the 1990s, are distinct; the latter seeks to dismantle the 
autonomy and mastery of the human agent. What is unique, however,  about Soviet war 
literature is the use of this prosthetic transformation of pain and injury into weaponry as a 
tool of war mobilization. The production of the national body depends on the excision of 
the injured limb that nonetheless persists in phantom form as an always available source 
for the continuous production of prosthetic national narrative.
The question of what happens afterwards, how memoralization looks back and 
revisits the phantom pain, displacing it in new ways, is beyond the scope of this paper. I 
would like to leave you, however, with an image from an important postwar work, 
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Erenburg's The Thaw (Ottepel', 1954) that gives some indication as to the fate of war 
time prosthetic superheroes—not the real life amputee veterans who were exiled from the 
capital cities, but their symbolic counterparts, the ordinary Soviet "real men," as 
represented in literary fiction.  
The characters in Erenburg's novel live in the bright future of happiness achieved, 
however, their illnesses, hysterical outbursts, and difficulty in speaking to one another 
indicate the weight of an intolerable burden. In The Thaw, the war is a closed topic. 
When, for example the young engineer Koroteev and Zhuravlev, the factory director, talk 
about their experiences during the war, Koroteev "felt that closeness which arises 
between former front-line soldiers: they knew something that others did not see and did 
not experience" (Erenburg Ottepel' 89). The war transcends ordinary conversation and 
approaches something like the sublime in its indescribability and overwhelming power. 
Those who experienced that sublimity, however, are left incapacitated by it. The men and 
women of steel, who had been reforged in the early years of the Soviet Union, and who 
were mobilized into human weapons during the war, appear a decade later as  "half-
finished" products (nedodelannyi polufabrikat) (Erenburg Ottepel' 93). Whatever 
Erenburg's flaws as a writer are, his novel lays bare the device that he himself helped to 
create,  revealing the abject body that is the twin of the prosthetic hero. 
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